[MPlayer-DOCS] CVS: homepage/src news.src.en,1.157,1.158

[Torinthiel CVS]

CVS change done by Torinthiel CVS

Update of /cvsroot/mplayer/homepage/src
In directory mail:/var2/tmp/cvs-serv16104

Modified Files:
	news.src.en 
Log Message:
s/tab/space/

Index: news.src.en
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsroot/mplayer/homepage/src/news.src.en,v
retrieving revision 1.157
retrieving revision 1.158
diff -u -r1.157 -r1.158
--- news.src.en	30 Oct 2004 17:33:16 -0000	1.157
+++ news.src.en	1 Nov 2004 18:15:37 -0000	1.158
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@
 Multiple vulnerabilities have been found and fixed in the Real-Time
 Streaming Protocol (RTSP) client for RealNetworks servers, including a
 series of potentially remotely exploitable buffer overflows. This is a
-joint	advisory by the MPlayer and xine teams as the code in question is
+joint advisory by the MPlayer and xine teams as the code in question is
 common to these projects. The xine team has assigned ID XSA-2004-3 to this
 security announcement.
 </p>
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@
 
 <ol>
 	<li>Fixed length buffers were assigned for the URL used in server requests
-		and	the length of the input was never checked. Very long URLs could thus
+		and the length of the input was never checked. Very long URLs could thus
 		overflow these buffers and crash the application. A malicious person
 		might possibly use a specially crafted URL or playlist to run arbitrary
 		code on the user's machine.</li>
@@ -703,13 +703,13 @@
 	<li>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 22:45:28 +0200 (CEST) a change was made to MPlayer
 		CVS that removes the extension checking on RTSP streams. MPlayer now
 		attempts to handle every RTSP connection as realrtsp first, falling back
-		to live.com RTSP. CVS	versions from that date to the time the fix was
+		to live.com RTSP. CVS versions from that date to the time the fix was
 		checked in are susceptible to the same problem when playing normal RTSP
 		streams as well.</li>
 	<li>At the time of the writing of this advisory no real exploits are known
 		to the authors and we hope to be the first to stumble across this
 		vulnerability. Since we believe that the bugs described in this advisory
-		are exploitable we have	released this proactive advisory.</li>
+		are exploitable we have released this proactive advisory.</li>
 </ol>
 
 <h3>Download:</h3>
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@
 </center>
 
 <p>
-MPlayer	received 44.61% of the votes, beating
+MPlayer received 44.61% of the votes, beating
 <a href="http://www.xmms.org">XMMS</a> with 27.90% and
 <a href="http://www.xinehq.de">xine</a> with 17.40%.
 </p>
@@ -1773,7 +1773,7 @@
 
 <ol>
 	<li><a href="mailto:peter.wilmar.christensen at kiss-technology.com">Mr. Christensen</a>
-	never took the time to read our	announcements.</li>
+	never took the time to read our announcements.</li>
 	<li><a href="mailto:peter.wilmar.christensen at kiss-technology.com">Mr. Christensen</a>
 	suggest they've implemented our subtitle format <i>way before we did it
 	ourselves</i>. The KiSS firmwares are all made in 2003, which is - as far